it "found purchasers among the unlearned who had heard that it contained a scurrilous preface, and hoped to extract from it a low enjoyment" (p. xi). I do not think Housman himself can entirely escape the moral judgment he so freely dispenses, but I think he has captured exactly the nature of the pleasure to be derived from such polemical exchanges.
To serve the purposes of knowledge, Agassi's review of my book must be regarded as an instance of a social and communicative practice into whose nature we may legitimately inquire. What is book reviewing? Certainly, reviewing is ubiquitous in our society: plays and films are reviewed, books and CDs, restaurants and national parks, automobiles and bicycle helmets. One model of reviewing as a social and communicative practice would generalize what these instances have in common. It is an economic model; reviewing is a way of telling us how to spend our hard-earned money wisely. In this model, the reviewer is an expert on our side, teaching us to avoid bad films and badly manufactured cars. Of course, in the case of academic book reviews, it is not money but attention that is the primary quality to be conserved. But the principle is the same; we want to avoid works that are, in Housman's (1961) piquant phrase, "little better than interruptions to our studies" (p. xii), mayflies of the intellect, promoted by claques. By separating the good from the bad, the reviewer conserves our valuable time. While I endorse this model generally, I shall have some serious questions concerning its application in the particular case of academic book reviewing. In the meantime, I shall examine Agassi's review of my book from the points of view of intellectual and ethical sufficiency.
While I acknowledge that my book, in Agassi's words, "covers an enormous amount of material from many fields: science, its philosophy, its history, its sociology, and policies about it" (p. 329), nonetheless many of the reviewer's comments seem disconcertingly abbreviated. I cite as an example the whole of his comment on my chapter on Darwin:
The chapter on the origins of Darwin's theory has the subtitle: "Science as Problem-Solving." I congratulate Gross on it and regret his neglect of it. Still, as the Darwin literature is huge, we should not expect him to do it justice. (P. 334) I cannot say whether I do the Darwin literature justice; that is for others to decide. But I do offer an alternate theory of Darwin's intellectual 446 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2000 development, one that takes serious issue with the reigning orthodoxy. I ground this disagreement on a thorough analysis of a short but crucial section of the notebooks. I conclude as follows:
I claim in this chapter that Darwin's most creative phase is appropriately described as a rhetorical transaction within the self. The Notebooks enact a drama of self-persuasion: Darwin is driven forward by the rush of new concepts and facts, yet held in check by the need to maintain the self as a coherent network of beliefs. As the elements in Darwin's complete theory approach their final shape, his style alters from a means of expression apparently in close touch with primary mental processes to one that anticipates public forums.
Coincident with this stylistic process, the arrangement of the Notebooks alters in character: isolated facts and concepts coalesce, intertwine, and, finally, unite into more and more fundamental law-like statements. But it is not in these statements that the unique character of the Notebooks lies; it is rather in the mental processes initiated in the most disjointed, least comprehensible entries. These most clearly display the special epistemic flavor of the Notebooks: a disciplined lack of commitment to the full truth of assertions, a deficiency that enables the evolutionary transformation to final theory. (Gross 1996, P. 159) My point isn't that Darwinians ought to have paid attention to my thesis; in my view, isolated forays into intellectual territory as well protected as Darwin studies are bound to fail of their purpose. Rather, I would like to capture the ethical presuppositions that underlie Agassi's judgment. They are important precisely because they are not personal; in my opinion, they belong to Agassi only insofar as he is a member of particular academic groups, namely, historians and philosophers of science. They are important also because they help us understand the science wars, a particular ritual combat between scientists, philosophers, and historians of science, on one hand, and literary, sociological, and rhetorical scholars, on the other.
The point of a pioneering work on the rhetoric of science ought to be whether the rhetorical is a legitimate perspective from which to view science and whether, as a consequence of that perspective, new insights are achieved. But the thrust of Agassi's review drives us back to a concern prior to these issues: the right of those outside an academic community to criticize the claims of those within. To be meaningful, such a right must coincide with the rights of those already in the community; equal status is a prerequisite to acting in a community's interest by testing the truth of their claims against criteria that, perhaps, have not occurred to them because their perspective is limited, as are all perspectives. In this particular case, I am arguing, DarGross / ETHICS OF BOOK REVIEWING 447 winians had an ethical obligation to take me seriously because the truth of one of their central claims was seriously at stake. But, of course, they need not pay attention to my criticisms so long as Agassi's judgment is in place, so long as I have not even mastered the literature. The claim that I lack mastery has an ethical as well as an intellectual dimension. It permits the inference that I have no right to be taken seriously. In the particular instance of the science wars, the general suggestion has been that literary and rhetorical scholars have no right to comment on science because they have not even mastered the literature. This is an inference encouraged, not only in Agassi's review but in Noretta Koertge's recent collection, A House Built on Sand (2000) .
My claim concerning moral condemnation may seem exaggerated. But consider Agassi's language. My book is "reader-hostile," my motives are base, a sort of academic imperialism designed to multiply rhetoric departments; I have committed "a flagrant violation of etiquette"; I have larded my work with "neo-Aristotelian rhetoric, post-modernist hermeneutics, and other debris." And this is to proceed no further than the first two paragraphs! These phrases are more than demagogical bids to curry favor with the biases of their supposed audience. In concert, they represent an attack on my character, on the right of a person so "rude" and so thoroughly seduced by current intellectual fads to the attention of an audience of those who study science seriously.
But haven't I already implied that Agassi's quarry is not my character but my book? I have indeed. Agassi's attack on my character is a linguistic by-product, an unintended consequence of the fact that our critical vocabulary has a moral as well as an intellectual valence. Of course, it is possible to be critical in full knowledge of these systematic ambiguities. Of two textual critics, Housman (1961) says, Having small literary culture they are not revolted by illiteracy, having slight knowledge of grammar they are not revolted by solecism, having no sequence of ideas they are not revolted by incoherency, having nebulous thoughts they are not revolted by nonsense. (P. 39) Clearly, the characters of Jacob and Bechert are as much at stake as their intellectual sufficiency. Housman is well aware of this; he understands exactly what he is doing:
Frailty of understanding is in itself no proper target for scorn and mockery. . . . But the unintelligent forfeit their claim to compassion 448 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES / September 2000 when they begin to indulge in self-complaisant airs, and to call themselves sane critics, meaning that they are mechanics. (P. 58) There is something distasteful, not to say repugnant, about the stance that Housman takes: it is behavior that seems appropriate, perhaps, only to God at the last judgment. At all events, it must be conceded that the candid bias of the critic makes a fair selection of flaws difficult and that the inference from intellectual flaws to ethical deficiencies is, simply, a non sequitur, unless an argument is made. To return to the case at hand, if I have neglected to master the relevant literature before tackling the subject of Darwin's intellectual development, then the inference from the intellectual to the moral may well be proper; but surely people of good character can be simply mistaken; intellectual are not automatically moral flaws. A case must be made.
Does the intellectual world need to be protected from the dangers of my book by a long, largely negative review? I contend that there is no danger whatever that our attention will be diverted by a bad academic book if it is simply not reviewed. There is an air of paradox when a scholar writes a lengthy review of a book that he apparently does not believe ought to have been published, especially by Harvard University Press. He says it "deserves public attention," but, after reading the review, one may legitimately wonder what on earth for. One suspects that another game is afoot, as in the case of John Searle's supposed review of a book of Jonathan Culler, in fact another entry in his debate with Jacques Derrida. But surely there is something wrong with using another human being's work as a missile in a war not of his making.
But I do not want my central point to vanish in a dust cloud of high dudgeon. The issues are not the personal ones of insult and vindication; they are professional, matters of disciplinary politics. Science studies have proliferated along with science itself. Latecomers, such as literature of science and rhetoric of science, have been regarded, understandably, as interlopers rather than as contributors to the conversation. Book reviews can help us make sense of this interesting chaos in science studies by bringing to the attention of journal audiences works generally beyond the horizon of their ken but nevertheless seriously and interestingly about the subject matter dearest to their hearts. If this task is to be accomplished properly, however, book review editors must take an active role in ensuring fairness-in the words of Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1997) , ensuring "at the minimum, accurate citation, representative quotation, nontendenGross / ETHICS OF BOOK REVIEWING 449
